The secure distribution of the secret random bit sequences known as "key" material, is an essential precursor to their use for the encryption and decryption of confidential communications. Quantum cryptography is a new technique for secure key distribution with single-photon lransmissions: Heisenberg's uncertainty principle ensures that an adversary can neither successfully tap the key transmissions, nor evade detection (eavesdropping raises the key error rate above a threshold value).
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY: INTRODUCTION
Two of the main goals of cryptography are the encryption of messages to render them unintelligible to third parties and their authentication to certify that they have not been modified. These goals can be accomplished if the sender ("Alice") and recipient ("Bob") both possess a secret random bit sequence known as "key" material, which they use as a parameter in a cryptographic algththm. It is essential that Alice and Bob acquire the key material with a high level of confidence that any third party ("Eve") does not have even partial information about the random bit sequence. If Alice and Bob communicate solely through classical messages it is impossible for them to generate a certifiably secret key owing to the possibility of passive eavesdropping. However, secure key distribution becomes possible if they use the single-photon communication technique of quantum cryptography, or more accurately, quantum key distribution (QKD),1 which was introduced in the mid1980s. The appeal of quantum cryptography is that its security is based on laws of nature, in contrast to existing methods of key distribution that derive their security from the perceived intractability of certain problems in number theory, or from the physical security of the distribution process.
Since the introduction of quantum citography, several groups (including our own) have demonstrated quantum nications23 and key dilributi5' ' ' 8, 9 over multi-kilometer distances of optical fiber. Free-space QKD (over an optical path of 32 cm) was first introduced in 1991,'° and recent advances have led to demonstrations of QKD over free-space indoor optical paths of 205 m," and outdoor optical paths of 75 rn.'2 These demonstrations increase the utility of QKD by extending it to line-of-site optical communications systems. Indeed there are certain key distribution problems in this category for which free-space QKD would have definite practical advantages (for example, it is impractical to send a courier to a sateffite). We are developing both optical fiber and free-space QKD prototypes, and here we report our results of freespace QKD over outdoor optical paths of up to 950 m under nighttime conditions. The success of QKD over free-space optical paths depends on the transmission and detection of single optical photons against a high background through a turbulent medium. Although this problem is difficult, a combination of sub-nanosecond timing, narrow filters'4' 15 spatial filtering" and adaptive optics16 can render the transmission and detection problems tractable. Furthermore, the essentially non-birefringent nature of the atmosphere at optical wavelengths allows the faithful transmission of the single-photon polarization states used in the free-space QKD protocol.
*coi.i.espondence: email: hugheslan1.izov; WWW: http://p23.lanl.gov/Quantum/quanturn.html
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY: THEORY
A QKD procedure starts with the sender, "Alice," generating a secret random binary number sequence. For each bit in the sequence, Alice prepares and transmits a single photon to the recipient, "Bob," who measures each arriving photon and attempts to identify the bit value Alice has transmitted. Alice's photon state preparations and Bob's measurements are chosen from sets of non-orthogonal possibilities. For example, using the B92 protocol17 Alice agrees with Bob (through public discussion) that she will transmit a horizontally-polarized single-photon state, IH>, for each I?Ø8in her sequence, and a rightcircularly-polarized single-photon state, IR>, for each "1" in her sequence. Bob agrees with Alice to randomly test the polarization of each arriving photon for vertical polarization, IV>, to reveal "is," or left-circular polarization, IL>, to reveal "Os." In this scheme Bob will never detect a photon for which he and Alice have used a preparation/measurement pair that corresponds to different bit values, such as III> and IV>, which happens for 50% of the bits in Alice's sequence. However, for the other 50% of Alice's bits the preparations and measurements use non-identical states, such as Iii> and IL>, resulting in a random 50% detection probability for Bob on this portion. Thus, by detecting single photons Bob identifies a random 25% portion of the bits in Alice's random sequence, assuming she transmits a single-photon Fock state for each bit and there are no bit losses in transmission or detection. This 25% efficiency factor, TQ,is the price that Alice and Bob must pay for secrecy.
Bob and Alice reconcile their common bits through a public discussion by revealing the locations, but not the bit values, in the sequence where Bob detected photons; Alice retains only those detected bits from her initial sequence. The resulting detected bit sequences comprise the raw key material from which a pure key is distilled using classical error detection techniques. The single-photon nature of the transmissions ensures that an eavesdropper, "Eve," can neither "tap" the key transmissions with a beam splitter (BS), owing to the indivisibility of a photon,18 nor copy them, owing to the quantum "nocloning" theorem.'9 Furthermore, the non-orthogonal nature of the quantum states ensures that if Eve makes her own measurements she will be detected through the elevated ernx rate she causes by the irreversible "collapse of the wavefunction."°3
.
FREE-SPACE QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPERIMENT
The QKD transmitter in our experiment (see figure 1 ) consisted of a temperature-controlled single-mode (SM) fiberpigtailed diode laser, a fiber to free-space launch system, a 2. A computer control system (Alice) starts the QKD protocol by pulsing the diode laser at a rate previously agreed upon between herself and the receiving computer control system (Bob). Each laser pulse is launched into free-space through the IF, and the '4-ns optical pulse is then attenuated to an average of less than one photon per pulse, based on the assumption of a statistical Poisson distribution. (The attenuated pulse only approximates a "single-photon" state; we tested out the system with averages down to < 0.1 photons per pulse. This corresponds to a 2-photon probability of < 0.5 % and implies that less than 6 of every 100 detectable pulses will contain 2 or more photons.) The photons that are transmitted by the optical attenuator are then polarized by the PBS, which transmits an average of less than one IH> photon to the Pockels cell. The 99
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Pockets cell is randomly switched to either pass the light unchanged as IH> (zero-wave retardation) or change it to ER> (quarter-wave retardation). The random switch setting is determined by discriminating the voltage generated by a white noise source.
The QKD receiver (see figure 2 ) was comprised of a 8.9-cm Cassegrain telescope followed by the receiver optics and detectors. The receiver optics consisted of a 50150 BS that randomly directs collected photons onto either of two distinct optical paths. The lower optical path contained a polarization controller (a quarter-wave retarder and a half-wave retarder) followed by a PBS to test collected photons for IH.>; the upper optical path contained a half-wave retarder followed by a PBS to test for ER>. One output port along each optical path was coupled by multi-mode (MM) fiber to a single-photon counting module (SPCM: EG'&G part number: SPCM-AQ 142-FL). [Although the receiver did not include IFs, the spatial filtering provided by the MM fibers effectively reduced noise caused by the ambient background during nighttime operations (.4 .1 kHz) to negligible levels.] i1 Retarder A single ER> photon traveling along the lower path encounters the polarization controller, and is converted to IV> and reflected away from the SPCM. Conversely, a single Iii> photon traveling the same path is converted to ER> and transmitted toward or reflected away from the SPCM in this path with equal probability. Similarly, a single Iii> photon traveling the upper path is converted to IV> and reflected away from the SPCM in this path, but a single ER> photon traveling this path is converted to IL> and transmitted toward or reflected away from the SPCM with equal probability.
The transmitter and receiver optics were operated over 240-, 500-, and 950-rn outdoor optical paths under nighttime conditions, with the transmitter and receiver co-located in order to simplify data acquisition. All optical paths were achieved by reflecting the emitted beam from a 25.4-cm mirrcr positioned at the half-way point of the transmission distance.
The optical coupling efficiency between the transmitter and receiver for the 950-rn path was i -44%, which accounts for losses between the transmitter and the MM fibers at the receiver. Bob's detection probability, "B e![1y]1e (1) is the convolution of the Poisson probability distribution of photons in Alice's transmitted weak pulse with average photon number ff, and the probability that Bob detects at least 1 photon. Here, y = (1 -11B), where =11 X 111) x i1, and 111) = 65% is Bob's detector efficiency. When the transmitter was pulsed at a rate of 20 kHz with an average of 0. The bit error rate (BER, defined as the ratio of the bits received in erri to the total number of bits received) for the 950-rn path was 1.5 % when the system was operating down to the < 0.1 photons per puise level. (A BER of -0.7 % was observed over the 240-rn optical path and a BER of.. 1.5 % was also observed over the 500-rn optical path.) A sample of raw key material from the 950-rn experiment with errors marked in bold type, is shown below:
A 100-bit sample ofAlice's (a) and Bob's (b) raw key material generated by free-space QKD over 1 km.
Bit ernrs caused by the ambient background were minimized to less than -1 every 9 s by narrow gated coincidence timing windows (-5 ns) and spatial filtering. Further, because detector dark noise (-80 Hz) contributed only about 1 dark count every 125 5, we believe that the observed BER was mostly caused by misalignment and imperfections in the optical elements (wave-plates and Pockels cell).
This experiment implemented a two-dimensional parity check scheme that allowed the generation of error-free key material. A further stage of "privacy amplification"2' is necessary to reduce any partial knowledge gained by an eavesdropper to less than 1-bit of information; we have not implemented such a privacy amplification protocol at this time. Our free-space QKD system does incorporate "one time pad" encryption22---the only provably secure encryption method---and could also support any other symmetric key system.
EAVESDROPPING ATTACKS
The original form of the B92 protocol has a weakness to an opaque attack by Eve. For example, Eve could measure Alice's photons in Bob's basis and only send a dim photon pulse when she identifies a bit. However, if Eve retransmits each observed bit as a single-photon she will noticeably lower Bob's bit-rate. To compensate for the additional attenuation to Bob's bit-rate Eve could send on a dim photon pulse of an intensity appropriate to raise Bob's bit-rate to a level similar to her own bit-rate with Alice. [In fact, if Eve sends a bright classical pulse (a pulse of a large average photon number) she guarantees that Bob's bit-rate is close to h own bit-rate with Alice.] However, this type of attack would be revealed by our two SPCM system through an increase in "dual-fire" errors, which occur when both SPCMs fire simultaneously. in a perfect system dual-fire errors would not exist, regardless of the average photon number per pulse, but in a real experimental system, where bit-errors occur, dual-fire errors will occur. (We have used the dual-fire information to estimate the average number of photons per pulse reaching the SPCMs.) Our system could also be modified to operate under the BB84 protocol' which also protects against an opaque attack.
Eve could also passively, or translucently, attack the the system using a BS and a receiver identical to Bob's (jerhaps of even higher efficiency) to identify some of the bits for which Alice's weak pulses contain me than 1 photon, i.e., Eve receives pulses reflected her way by the BS which has reflection probability R, whereas Bob receives the lransmitted pulses, and the BS has transmission probability T = 1 -R. Introducing a coupling and detection efficiency factor iE, for Eve, analogous to Bob's iB, we find that Eve's photon detection probability is E = e_BR whereas Bob's detection probability becomes B = e_iT .(Note: we do not explicitly consider any eavesdropping strategy, with without guessing, in which Eve might use more than 2 detectors.)
The important quantity in a BS attack is the ratio of the number of bits Eve shares with Bob to the number of bits Bob and Alice share. We find that the probability that Eve and Bob will both observe a photon on the same pulse from Alice is23 "BAE (2) To take an exireme case, ifEve's BS has R = 0.9999, her efficiency is perfect (i.e., iE =0.25), and Alice iransmits pulses of = 0.1, then Eve's knowledge BAE/B ofBob and Alice's common key will never be more than 2.5%. Thus, Alice and Bob have an upper bound on the amount of privacy amplification needed to protect against a BS attack. Of course, such an attack would cause Bob's bit-rate to drop to near zero; for smaller reflection coefficients, R, Eve's information on Bob and o I.
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